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Due to the current economic downturn, Americans understand that
workers are struggling to pay their bills as a result of insufficient wages.
It is also widely known that despite increases in corporate profits, large
numbers of workers have faced layoffs or struggled with sluggish wage
1
increases. However, amidst these tumultuous financial times, many
Americans are surprised to discover that the United States also faces a
2
wage theft crisis. Wage theft occurs when employers steal “money
∗ Todd Anthony Palo, Associate, Fox Rothschild, LLP. I would like to thank my father,
Richard T. Palo, former Director of Connecticut’s Department of Labor OSHA Division, for
all his guidance and support over the years.
1
STEVEN GREENHOUSE, THE BIG SQUEEZE: TOUGH TIMES FOR THE AMERICAN WORKER 4
(2008).
2
KIM BOBO, WAGE THEFT IN AMERICA: WHY MILLIONS OF WORKING AMERICANS ARE
NOT GETTING PAID – AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT xi (2009).
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3

from workers by cheating them of wages owed.” The Fair Labor
4
Standards Act of 1938 (hereinafter “FLSA”), created the statutory right
that all workers should be paid a federally mandated minimum wage for
5
hours worked. Concurrently, the FLSA also created the Department of
Labor’s Wage and Hour Division (hereinafter the “Agency”), which is
6
responsible for enforcing the right to a minimum wage. However,
inadequate enforcement of the right to minimum wage has allowed
7
wage theft to grow into a “national epidemic.” Thus, critics assert that
American labor laws are failing the workers that they were designed to
8
protect because the Agency has not adequately enforced them.
This Article will analyze the Wage and Hour Division’s duty to
enforce the right to a federal minimum wage from a moral rights
perspective. The Article will demonstrate that some moral theorists
divide rights into positive and negative categories which create
9
distinctive correlative duties. This Article will argue that the enactment
of the FLSA created a positive right to a federal minimum wage, and
subsequently, a moral duty to enforce the right in both the Wage and
Hour Division, as well as in society generally. In addition, this Article
will examine the duty to enforce the statutory right to a minimum wage
through moral theorist Henry Shue’s hierarchical analysis of rights. The
Article will demonstrate that Shue does not divide rights into a positive
10
and negative dichotomy, but rather into basic and non-basic categories.
The Article will assert that the right to a federal minimum wage is likely
a non-basic human right and that by applying Shue’s theory, the
Agency’s failed enforcement is defensible because sometimes non-basic
rights must be sacrificed to preserve basic rights.
The Article will also analyze the right to a federal minimum wage

3

Id.
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-262 (2010).
5
29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (2010).
6
29 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2010).
7
Paul Grondahl, Help Wanted: Long Hours, No Pay, TIMES UNION (Albany), Mar. 5,
2009, at A3 (“‘Wage theft is a national epidemic,’ said Kim Bobo, author of a newly
published book, ‘Wage Theft in America.’”).
8
E.g., BOBO, supra note 2, at 107-23, 161.
9
See, e.g., Manuel Velasquez et al., Rights, MARKKULA CTR. FOR APPLIED ETHICS
SANTA CLARA UNIV., http://www.scu.edu/ethics/practicing/decision/rights.html (last visited
Oct. 18, 2010).
10
HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS 19 (1980).
4
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from Stephen Holmes’ legal rights perspective. Although Holmes
asserts that most legal rights generate an affirmative duty of
12
enforcement upon government, this Article will argue that the costs of
rights can limit a government’s duty. Thus, the Article’s analysis will
conclude that the Wage and Hour Division’s failure to enforce the right
to a minimum wage is justifiable under a legal rights analysis because
the Agency is under-resourced.
Part I of this Article will define wage theft and describe in more
detail how it occurs. Part I will also explain the widespread influence
wage theft has on all types of workers.
Part II will introduce the FLSA and, specifically, the legal right to
a federally mandated minimum wage created by the statute. Part II will
also introduce the FLSA’s establishment of the Wage and Hour
Division, which was entrusted with the duty to supervise, enforce, and
administer the statutory right.
Part III will analyze the Wage and Hour Division’s failure to
enforce the statutory right to a minimum wage. First, Part III will assert
that the Agency’s failure to clearly interpret the FLSA has contributed
to its failed enforcement. Second, Part III will assert that the Agency is
severely understaffed and under-resourced, which has contributed to its
inability to properly enforce the right to a minimum wage. Finally, Part
III will argue that the Agency has not consistently administered strict
penalties for violations of the FLSA, which has contributed to the
proliferation of wage theft.
Part IV will examine the widespread effects wage theft can have
not only on individual workers, but also on the national workforce and
the nationwide economy.
Part V will introduce the definition of a right from various moral
and legal perspectives. First, Part V will describe various moral
theorists’ definitions of rights and the correlative duties that are created
by positive and negative rights distinctions. Second, Part V will outline
Henry Shue’s hierarchical approach to rights, which divides rights into
basic and non-basic categories for the purpose of determining which can
be sacrificed. Finally, Part V will describe Stephen Holmes’ legal
definition of rights and the accompanying affirmative duty of the
11
See generally STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY
LIBERTY DEPENDS ON TAXES (1999).
12
Id. at 43-44.
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government to enforce those rights.
Part VI of the Article will analyze whether the Wage and Hour
Division’s failure to prevent wage theft is justifiable under both moral
and legal perspectives of rights. Part VI will demonstrate that from a
positive/negative rights dichotomy, the Agency’s failures are justifiable
because there is an affirmative moral duty on society to help sustain the
general welfare of all workers. Part VI will then examine the Wage and
Hour Division’s failure to prevent wage theft pursuant to Shue’s
hierarchical analysis. The Article will assert that Shue would likely
consider the right to a minimum wage a non-basic right, and therefore,
it can be sacrificed to preserve other basic human rights such as
personal security. Finally, Part VI will examine the Agency’s duty
pursuant to Stephen Holmes’ legal rights theory, and will conclude that
the cost of rights can justify the government’s failure to fulfill its duty to
enforce the minimum wage.
Finally, Part VII will conclude by outlining some actions the Wage
and Hour Division and society can initiate in order to better fulfill their
duty to enforce the right to minimum wage.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO WAGE THEFT
Wage theft is an illegal practice that has grown to a crisis level, but
amidst the present economic downturn few Americans are aware it
13
exists, let alone are even familiar with what the term means. Kimberly
Bobo, the founder of Interfaith Worker Justice and likely the
14
predominant expert on wage theft, defines wage theft as “when an
employer violates the law and deprives a worker of legally mandated
15
wages.” The national organization Interfaith Worker Justice defines
wage theft more specifically as the problem among “[h]undreds of
thousands of workers, particularly those in low-wage jobs, [who] suffer
16
the theft of their earned wages by unscrupulous employers.” Thus,
wage theft can be defined as when an employer deprives an employee of
13

BOBO, supra note 2, at xi, 41.
See Grondahl, supra note 7; Press Release, Interfaith Worker Justice, S. Labor
Comm. to Hold Hearing On Extreme Abuses: Wage Theft Expert Kim Bobo to Deliver
Testimony (Mar. 9, 2009), available at http://www.iwj.org/detail/news.cfm?news_id
=71&id=80.
15
BOBO, supra note 2, at 7.
16
Wage Theft - Expanded Definition, INTERFAITH WORKER JUSTICE, http://www.iwj.org
/template/page.cfm?id=147 (last visited Oct. 18, 2010).
14
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pay which he or she is due as remuneration for work performed.
17
Wage theft can occur in a variety of ways. Generally, wage theft
18
transpires through intentional conduct by employers. Employers
engage in wage theft when they misclassify employees to keep them
from receiving overtime pay, issue paychecks that do not reflect the
total compensation owed, deny workers their final paychecks after
employment has been terminated, or refuse to pay workers the
19
prevailing wage on government contracts. Additionally, wage theft
20
often occurs because employers keep workers’ tips, pressure workers
21
to pay to keep their jobs, or pressure employees to work off-the-clock
22
in order to reduce production costs. Many employers also commit
wage theft by not paying workers at all, often by giving them paychecks
23
that bounce. Finally, wage theft commonly occurs – and for the
purposes of this Article the term will strictly refer to – when employers
24
pay workers below the statutory minimum wage required by the FLSA.
Often, employers will illegally bargain with workers to compensate
them below the minimum wage or will misclassify workers as
independent contractors so that they can avoid paying them in
25
accordance with the FLSA-regulated minimum wage. Subsequently,
millions of workers are victims of wage theft because they are paid less
26
than the federal minimum wage each year.
Wage theft happens to all types of workers. It is a widespread and
27
pervasive problem, which in recent years has grown into a “national
28
epidemic.” It occurs “in every income-tax bracket, in every industry, in
29
30
every state.” Wage theft can and has occurred in all business models.
17

BOBO, supra note 2, at 23.
Id.; see also Stop Wage Theft: Welcome to the Online Wage Theft Resource Center,
INTERFAITH WORKER JUSTICE, http://www.wagetheft.org/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2010).
19
Wage Theft - Expanded Definition, supra note 16.
20
BOBO, supra note 2, at 32-33.
21
Id. at 29.
22
Id. at 51.
23
Id. at 27, 33-34.
24
Id. at 25.
25
Id. at 35-39.
26
BOBO, supra note 2, at 25.
27
Id. at 7.
28
Grondahl, supra note 7.
29
Welcome to the Online Wage Theft Resource Center, supra note 18.
30
Dan Horn, Wage-theft Reports On The Rise, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Aug. 29, 2009, at
18
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Several large corporations have settled cases involving allegations of
31
failure to pay minimum wages. However, wage theft is most common
among smaller enterprises such as construction and housekeeping
32
companies, restaurants, car washes, and farms. Illegal immigrants and
low-wage workers are frequently the victims of wage theft because
33
those workers have fewer resources to contest or recover their wages.
Wage theft tends to be more prevalent amongst low-wage and
immigrant workers in the Midwestern United States, but occurs quite
34
consistently throughout all regions. Despite prominence in low-wage
and illegal immigrant populations, wage theft affects many middle35
income, legal citizens as well. Wage theft also affects all workers
36
despite different physical characteristics. “[Y]oung workers, midcareer
37
workers, and older workers” are all victims of wage theft. “[T]he

N.
31
See, e.g., Press Release, United Food and Commercial Workers Int’l Union, Gourmet
Grocery Workers Fight Back Against Wage Theft (Feb. 26, 2009), available at
http://www.ufcw.org/press_room/index.cfm?pressReleaseID=421(stating that the owners of
New York retail gourmet grocery chains Amish Market, Zeytinia, Zeytuna, and other related
stores settled with workers for $1.5 million after the Department of Labor discovered
workers were being paid less than the minimum wage and were not receiving overtime
wages); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, CVS Pharmacy Inc. Agrees To Pay More Than
$226,000 In Penalties and More Than $38,000 In Back Wages Following Investigation By
U.S. Labor Dep’t (Dec. 10, 2007), http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/esa/
archive/ESA20071543.htm (stating that CVS Pharmacy paid over $38,000 to fifty-one
workers in order to settle charges of failure to pay minimum wage and overtime); Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Gas Station/Convenience Store Chain Agrees to Pay $1
Million To Settle U.S. Labor Dep’t Lawsuit (April 2, 2007), available at
http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/esa/archive/ESA20070426.htm (stating that employees
working at Chestnut Petroleum Dist. Inc., with thirty-seven gas station/convenience store
locations throughout New York, New Jersey and Connecticut area, were being paid less
than the federal minimum wage).
32
Horn, supra note 30; see also Grondahl, supra note 7, at 2.
33
BOBO, supra note 2, at 7, 21, 45-46.
34
Abel Valenzuela Jr. et al., On the Corner: Day Labor in the United States, 14-15
(2006), available at http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/issr/csup/uploaded_files/Natl_DayLaborOn_the_Corner1.pdf (presenting a 2004 survey of day laborers over a two month period in
the Western, Midwestern, Southwestern, Southern and Eastern regions of the United States
that demonstrated that 66% of the workers surveyed were not paid wages at one time or
another in the Midwest and 53% were underpaid wages in the Midwest, whereas all other
regions found that consistently approximately 49% of the workers surveyed were either
underpaid or not paid at all).
35
BOBO, supra note 2, at 7, 21-22.
36
Cf. id. at 7, 45-50.
37
Id. at 7.
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largest dollar amounts are stolen from native-born white and black
38
workers,” however, low-wage job categories that are dominated by
women and other races tend to incur large wage losses as a result of
39
wage theft as well. Regardless of the widespread occurrence of wage
theft, the circumstances under which it occurs are often similar whether
conducted by a small landscaping contractor against an immigrant
worker or by a large corporate entity like CVS against a middle class
40
citizen employee.
II. THE STATUTORY RIGHT TO A FEDERAL MINIMUM WAGE
Wage theft is a crime because workers have the legal right to a
41
federally mandated minimum wage rate under the FLSA. Pursuant to
the current version of the statute, “[e]very employer shall pay to each of
his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce . . . wages . . . not less than” a
42
federally determined wage. This clause is commonly interpreted by the
43
courts to apply equally to both immigrant and citizen workers. At the
time of the FLSA’s enactment, the minimum wage was set at twenty44
45
five cents per hour. That figure has risen to $7.25 per hour. Thus, the
38

Id.
Id. at 47-50 (stating that for many employers, racism and sexism justifies treating
some workers as inferior human beings or even disposable commodities).
40
Compare U.S. Suit Says Nursery Paid Illegal Wages, N.Y. TIMES, April 10, 2007, at
B4 (stating that certain Pro Tree workers were not being paid a minimum wage), with Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, CVS Pharmacy Inc., supra note 31 (stating that CVS
Pharmacy paid over $38,000 to fifty-one workers in order to settle charges of failure to pay
minimum wage and overtime).
41
29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (2010).
42
Id.
43
See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Nicholas Zito Racing Stable, Inc., No. 04 CV 22, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 27598 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2008) (permitting undocumented workers to sue as a
class for unpaid overtime wages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act); Serrano v.
Underground Util. Corp., 970 A.2d 1054 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (permitting
undocumented workers to recover damages for statutory violations for work already done).
44
JEROLD WALTMAN, THE POLITICS OF THE MINIMUM WAGE 34 (2000) (“The bill finally
passed, setting a minimum wage of twenty-five cents per hour, with increases of five cents
per year until it reached forty cents.”).
45
29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)(c) (“Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who in
any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is
employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce, wages at the following rates: except as otherwise provided in this section, not
less than 7.25 per hour.”).
39
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FLSA requires that any individual presently employed by an employer
should at least receive a minimum wage of $7.25 per hour for work
46
performed in commerce barring any exceptions.
The enactment of the FLSA also created a correlative duty upon
47
the government to enforce the minimum wage right. The duty of
enforcement was created when the FLSA established the Department of
48
Labor’s Wage and Hour Division : “There is hereby created in the
Department of Labor a Wage and Hour Division which shall be under
the direction of an Administrator [who] shall investigate conditions in
the industry . . . and receive such evidence as may be necessary or
49
appropriate . . . to perform its duties and functions under this Act,”
50
including the supervision of unpaid minimum wages. Thus, it can be
inferred that the Agency is vested with the administrative and
enforcement authority to ensure that the right to a federally mandated
51
minimum wage is protected. The duty of enforcement is further
evidenced by Congresswoman Linda Sanchez’s interpretation of the
FLSA. Sanchez stated in a Congressional hearing, which in part
explored the problem of wage theft, that the FLSA did not merely
suggest a rate of payment, but it created a right to a minimum wage that
52
the federal government should help enforce. Sanchez also inferred that
by creating the Wage and Hour Division, Congress intended not to
place the burden of recovering fair wages solely on workers, but on the
53
government as well. Therefore, the FLSA created a duty upon the
Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division to investigate,
46

29 U.S.C. § 206(a).
29 U.S.C. § 204 (2010); WALTMAN, supra note 44 (stating that the Bill provided “for
a flat national minimum wage and the vesting of administrative authority in a single
[government] agency”).
48
Id.
49
29 U.S.C. § 204(a).
50
29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (2010) (“The Secretary is authorized to supervise the payment of
the unpaid minimum wages.”).
51
29 U.S.C. § 204.
52
Is DOL Effectively Enforcing Our Wage and Hour Laws?: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 110th Cong. 54 (2008) [hereinafter DOL Enforcement
Hearing] (statement of Hon. Linda T. Sanchez, Member, H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor),
available
at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_house_
hearings&docid=f:43310.pdf.
53
Id. (“The burden of recovering fair wages when they have been denied should not rest
entirely on the shoulders of workers. The federal government should vigorously enforce its
own laws.”).
47

PALO (DO NOT DELETE)

44

12/6/2010 11:55 AM

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

Vol. 35:1

supervise, and enforce the statutory right to a federal minimum wage.

54

III. THE WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION’S FAILURE TO FULFILL
ITS DUTY
In part, wage theft occurs because the Wage and Hour Division has
55
failed to fulfill its duty to enforce the right to a minimum wage.
Specifically, the Agency has not clearly defined who is a protected
employee under the FLSA, which has contributed to the Agency’s
56
failure to fulfill its enforcement duty. In addition, the Agency is
severely under-resourced and understaffed, which has hindered its
57
investigative and enforcement duties. Finally, the Wage and Hour
Division does not administer strict penalties, which has hampered its
ability to supervise and enforce the statutory right to a federal minimum
58
wage.
A. The Agency’s Inability to Clearly Interpret the FLSA Has
Contributed to Its Failure to Fulfill Its Duty
The Wage and Hour Division has not clearly interpreted which
classifications of workers are protected by the FLSA, and therefore,
59
ambiguities have impeded enforcement as well as fostered wage theft.
Pursuant to the FLSA, “any individual employed by an employer” to
60
work is entitled to the federal minimum wage. It would appear that
under the FLSA all employees are entitled to the minimum wage.
54

29 U.S.C. § 204 (2010); WALTMAN, supra note 44.
Cf. BOBO, supra note 2, at 161.
56
Id. at 64, 67.
57
Id. at 52-53, 114-23; Interreligious Working Grp. On Domestic Human Needs, End
Wage Theft: More Funding Needed for the Wage and Hour Division of DOL, FRIENDS
COMM. ON NAT’L LEGISLATION, http://www.fcnl.org/pdfs/budget/wage_theft_letter.pdf (last
visited Oct. 19, 2010).
58
BOBO, supra note 2, at 52-53.
59
Id. at 64, 67; see also Providing Fairness to Workers Who Have Been Misclassified as
Independent Contractors: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Workforce Prots. of the H.
Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 110th Cong. 15 (2007) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of
Catherine K. Ruckelshaus, Litigation Director, National Employment Law Project),
available at http:// http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_house_
hearings&docid=f:34139.pdf.
60
29 U.S.C. §§ 203(e)(1), (2010); see also Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., Inc., 355 F.3d
61, 66 (2d Cir. 2003) (“This definition is necessarily a broad one, in accordance with the
remedial purpose of the FLSA.”).
55
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However, the statute excludes independent contractors from statutory
61
protection. As a result, independent contractors can legally be paid
62
below federal minimum wage rates. The exclusion of independent
contractors from protection creates an enforcement problem because the
FLSA does not define the term independent contractor. In fact,
according to the United States Government Accountability Office, “no
[federal] definitive test exists to distinguish whether a worker is an
63
employee or an independent contractor.” Generally, in determining
whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor pursuant to
64
the FLSA, courts apply the “economic reality test.” However, the
Wage and Hour Division does not consistently apply the economic
65
reality test, but instead sometimes refers to other federal definitions.
Therefore, the Wage and Hour Division often spends unnecessary time
determining whether an employee is protected by the statute, rather than
66
fulfilling their duty to enforce the minimum wage right. The inability
61

29 U.S.C. §§ 203(e)(1), (r)(1).
Hearing, supra note 59.
63
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-656, EMPLOYMENT ARRANGEMENTS:
IMPROVED OUTREACH COULD HELP ENSURE PROPER WORKER CLASSIFICATION 51 (2006),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06656.pdf.
64
Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Determination of “independent contractor” and
“employee” Status for Purposes of § 3(e)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C.A. §
203(e)(1)), 51 A.L.R. FED. 702 (2009). Pursuant to the economic reality test, the
following criteria have been mentioned in determining whether an employment
relationship existed: (1) the extent to which the services in question are an
integral part of the ‘employer’s’ business; (2) the amount of the ‘employee’s’
investment in facilities and equipment; (3) the nature and degree of control
retained or exercised by the ‘employer’; (4) the ‘employee’s’ opportunities for
profit or loss; (5) the amount of initiative, skill, judgment or foresight required
for the success of the claimed independent enterprise; and (6) the permanency
and duration of the relationship. The courts have indicated that the following
factors are not controlling in determining the relationship between the worker
and the alleged employer: (1) the intent of the parties and contractual
designations. Likewise, in cases involving the FLSA the courts have stated that
the following factors, although not controlling, may be considered in
determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship: the investment
in facilities, whether the worker is really engaging in an independent business as
distinguished from performing personal labor, the opportunity for the worker to
profit or loss depending on his managerial skill, the permanency of the
relationship between the alleged employer and employee and the skill or
training required to perform the work . . .
Id.
65
Cf. BOBO, supra note 2, at 64, 67.
66
Id. at 64.
62
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of the Agency to clearly interpret who is a statutorily covered employee
has fostered wage theft, and subsequently impeding the Wage and Hour
67
Division’s duty to enforce the FLSA.
B. Financial Constraints Have Negatively Impacted The Duty Of
Enforcement
The Wage and Hour Division is under-resourced and understaffed,
which has contributed to the Agency’s failure to fulfill its duty to
68
enforce the minimum wage. The FLSA granted the right to a federal
minimum wage and created the Wage and Hour Division to enforce that
right; however, the government has not allocated adequate funds to
69
sufficiently support the Agency’s task. The Department of Labor’s
70
budget for 2008 was $50.4 billion. The budget of the Employment
Standards Division, the division responsible for wage and hour
71
enforcement, was approximately $3.5 billion in 2008. Only $187.1
million of that $3.5 billion budget was allocated to the Wage and Hour
72
Division for staff and enforcement. This equates to approximately onethird of one percent of the entire Department of Labor’s budget being
73
spent on wage and hour enforcement. Thus, these budgetary
constraints likely caused the Agency’s current staffing problems, which
have impeded its ability to fulfill its enforcement duty.
Understaffing, perhaps due to the Department of Labor’s budgetary
constraints, has contributed to the Wage and Hour Division’s failure to
fulfill its enforcement duty and has helped foster the occurrence of wage
74
theft. The Administrators of the Wage and Hour Division and the
Government Accountability Office both implied during a congressional
hearing relating to wage theft that because of a lack of resources, the

67

Id. at 64, 67-68.
Id. at 52-53, 114-23; see also Interreligious Working Grp. On Domestic Human
Needs, supra note 57.
69
Cf. BOBO, supra note 2, at 52-53, 114-23.
70
FY 2008 Budget Overview, U.S DEP’T. OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/
_sec/Budget2008/overview.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2010).
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id. ($187.1 million budget of Division of Wage and Hour for 2008 divided by $50.4
billion budget for the Department of Labor in 2008).
74
BOBO, supra note 2, at 52-53, 114-23; Interreligious Working Grp. On Domestic
Human Needs, supra note 57.
68
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75

Agency’s ability to enforce labor laws is hindered. During that same
hearing, Congressman Phil Hare testified that he does not believe that
the Wage and Hour Division has the requisite staff to combat wage
76
theft. The Agency’s understaffing problem is further evidenced by the
number of its employees as compared to the number of workers in the
United States. The number of federal wage and hour investigators has
77
shrunk considerably as compared to one half century ago : “Today,
Wage and Hour investigators are responsible for enforcing wage laws
covering more than 130 million full- and part-time workers, working in
78
approximately seven million workplaces.” Amongst a staff of only
1000 workers in the Federal Department of Labor, there are fewer than
750 federal investigators. Each investigator is responsible for more than
79
170,000 workers and 9000 workplaces. This is a devastating figure
when compared to the 1500 investigators that were assigned to police
80
fifteen million workers in 1941. As a result of understaffing,
employees’ and workers’ rights advocates have found that the Wage
and Hour Division “does not consistently work with community
partners, refuses to involve workers and advocates in helping gather
information for supporting cases, ignores recommendations for targeted
81
investigations, and sometimes won’t even return . . . phone calls.”
Thus, “[t]he overall crisis in terms of investigators means that any
82
vulnerable subset of workers is inadequately protected,” because the
Agency is ill-equipped to satisfy its duty of enforcement.

75

DOL Enforcement Hearing, supra note 52, at 13, 47 (statement of Alexander
Passantino, Acting Administrator, United States Department of Labor Wage and Hour
Division); Id. at 28, 30, 39, 43 (statement of Greg Kutz, Managing Director, Government
Accountability Office).
76
Id. at 38 (statement of Hon. Phil Hare, Member, H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor) (“I
don’t question the dedication of the employees here. I think a large part of this maybe it is
just—would like to know your thought on this—I don’t think you have enough people, A, to
enforce the laws that we currently have, and I think that is certainly part of the problem.”).
77
GREENHOUSE, supra note 1, at 291.
78
BOBO, supra note 2, at 116.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 119.
81
DOL Enforcement Hearing, supra note 52, at 17 (statement of Kim Bobo, Executive
Director, Interfaith Worker Justice).
82
BOBO, supra note 2, at 117.
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C. Failure to Impose Strict Penalties Has Contributed to the Lack
of Enforcement
Although the FLSA is ambiguous in part, it could restrict or
minimize wage theft if the Agency more adequately enforced the
83
statute. In fact, a Government Accounting Office investigation
suggests that “the Department of Labor currently has the necessary tools
to fight wage theft, [but] suggests that the problem of wage theft is only
84
getting worse because of weaker enforcement.” When investigators do
prosecute employers for “stealing wages, many of them are not given
85
consequences that are sufficient for changing behavior.” Pursuant to
the FLSA, the Secretary of the Department of Labor (hereinafter
“Secretary”) can seek an injunction, which confers upon the District
Courts jurisdiction to restrain violations of the FLSA and to enforce
86
judgments for past-due wages. In addition, the Secretary can seek a
fine of not more than $10,000, liquidated damages, or imprisonment for
87
not more than six months for a violation of the FLSA. However, steep
88
fines or imprisonment are rarely issued. In fact, the most common
penalty administered “is that the employer will have to pay the wages
89
the employer should have paid in the first place.” Being forced to pay
employees the wages that they were originally owed is hardly a penalty,
but rather “employers in effect get a no-interest loan from their
90
workers.” Additionally, in many instances employers are able to avoid
91
paying employees their entire past-due wages. Pursuant to the FLSA, if
an action is not commenced within two years after the unlawful conduct
92
has occurred, the party will be barred from litigation. Therefore, stolen
wages beyond the two year statute of limitations cannot be recovered.
83

Id. at 52-53.
DOL Enforcement Hearing, supra note 52, at 2 (statement of Hon. George Miller,
Chairman, H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor).
85
BOBO, supra note 2, at 53.
86
29 U.S.C. §§ 216, 217 (2010); see also Mitchell v. Lublin, 358 U.S. 207 (1959).
87
29 U.S.C. § 216 (no one may be imprisoned under the FLSA except for an offense
committed after conviction for a prior offense and pursuant to administrative proceedings of
the Department of Labor).
88
Interview with Wilson Sada, Representative, U.S. Dep’t of Labor Wage and Hour
Div. (Oct. 20, 2009).
89
BOBO, supra note 2, at 145.
90
Id. at 146.
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Id.
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29 U.S.C. § 255 (2006).
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Thus, employers are not deterred from committing wage theft because
93
of the lack of enforcement. Ultimately, because the Wage and Hour
Division fails to consistently enforce strict penalties, wage theft has
94
become a crime without consequences.
IV. EFFECTS OF THE LACK OF ENFORCEMENT
The effects of wage theft spread beyond the mere individual who
95
has his or her pay stolen. Wage theft “is bad for America. It hurts
workers [and their families], it places ethical employers at a competitive
disadvantage, [it undermines the Department of Labor,] it robs
resources from the public coffers, and it denies communities of the
96
economic stimulus.”
Wage theft harms workers and their families because victims of
97
wage theft still have to pay for food, clothes, and child care. Moreover,
victims of wage theft have more difficulty saving for their children’s
education, paying for healthcare, and making payments on their homes,
and therefore, have to spend additional time away from their families
98
working.
Wage theft also has negative effects on the national labor force.
When society permits “employers to steal wages from some workers, it
99
drives down wages and standards for all workers.” When small
businesses and corporations engage in wage theft, they are often “more
100
inclined to injure or steal from workers in other ways” as well. When
wage theft occurs, workers are also subject to unsafe work
101
environments and various other threats. Moreover, wage theft puts
those ethical employers that would usually not consider underpaying

93

BOBO, supra note 2, at 53, 145-47.
Id. at 144.
95
See BOBO, supra note 2, at 21-22.
96
DOL Enforcement Hearing, supra note 52, at 16 (statement of Kim Bobo, Executive
Director, Interfaith Worker Justice).
97
BOBO, supra note 2, at 21-22.
98
Id. at 22.
99
Id. at 22, 50.
100
Stephen Franklin, Forgotten Corners of the Economy, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT,
Oct. 21, 2009, at A16.
101
Janine Zeitlin, Ignored and Cheated; Farm Workers Earn Nada in America’s Green
Bean
Capital,
MIAMI
NEW
TIMES,
Mar.
13,
2008,
available
at
http://www.miaminewtimes.com/2008-03-13/news/ignored-and-cheated/.
94
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their workers at a competitive disadvantage. The illegal conduct
undermines ethical businesses and could drive them to engage in wage
103
theft in order to keep up with competitors in the market.
Continued existence of wage theft can also undermine the Wage
and Hour Division. If wage theft is permitted to continue without
adequate enforcement of the right to a minimum wage, an already
under-resourced Agency could be spread thinner. The Government
Accountability Office has already implied that the Agency’s morale
may be a contributing factor to the lack of wage and hour
104
enforcement, and additional wage theft cases could cause that morale
to plummet further. Additionally, the impact of increased wage and
hour violations could lead not only to a collapse of the morale of the
Agency, but public confidence in the Wage and Hour Division could
105
also erode, further undermining its enforcement capabilities. The
number of FLSA private lawsuits has already quadrupled in the last ten
106
years. Kimberly Bobo asserts that one could argue that lawyers are
107
just becoming overzealous. But she believes that it is more likely that
there is an “explosion of workers not being paid and filing [private]
lawsuits in part because the Wage and Hour Division is not able to
108
handle cases.”
Finally, wage theft steals from the public coffers and can affect the

102

BOBO, supra note 2, at 22, 50.
Id.
104
DOL Enforcement Hearing, supra note 52, at 39 (statement of Greg Kutz, Managing
Director, Government Accountability Office); Id. at 43 (statement of Hon. Yvette D. Clarke,
Member, H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor) (“If their morale is down, if they are overwhelmed
with respect to the number of cases that they have, how does that go to the quality of the
work and their pursuit of justice for these workers?”).
105
Id. at 30-31 (statement of Hon. Dale E. Kildee, Vice Chairman, H. Comm. on Educ.
and Labor)
I think we could say that, generally speaking, when you have no policemen
around that maybe crime – other types of crimes – can be committed, and that
you have to have – the idea that apprehension and enforcement is going to be
there in order to get compliance . . . . I do know that I could play a role in
making sure that someone would make a complaint, and they had greater
assurance that the employer would be forced to comply with the law, but I don’t
see that as much now.
Id.
106
Id. at 32 (statement of Kim Bobo, Executive Director, Interfaith Worker Justice).
107
Id.
108
Id.
103
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109

national economy. In the midst of the current economic crisis, people
are finding themselves increasingly out of work. The current economic
instability combined with employer corruption has created an
atmosphere where threats of job loss are used to maintain wage theft
110
practices, consequently worsening the financial crisis. Wage theft
leads to “[b]illions of dollars in wages being illegally stolen from
111
millions of workers each and every year.” This can lead to both
employers and employees underpaying taxes and creating unnecessary
112
encumbrances on social services. In addition, with less revenue being
circulated, less income is being spent locally and throughout the
113
national economy. This is especially true when wage theft is
perpetrated against low- and moderate-income workers and their
families: “Economists are clear that the most effective way to facilitate
the use and spending of money is to give it to low- and moderateincome families. Few will hoard it away . . . . the money is circulated in
the communities, which is precisely the kind of economic stimulus the
114
nation needs.” Thus, the effects of wage theft spread well beyond the
individual worker, and therefore, the statutory right to a minimum wage
must be more vehemently enforced.
V. MORAL AND LEGAL IMPETUS TO ENFORCE A RIGHT
Stephen Holmes argues that broadly there are two distinct ways to
115
define rights: moral and legal. Holmes states that the moral approach
identifies rights with ethical principles; “[i]t identifies rights not by
consulting statutes and case law, but by asking what human beings are
116
morally entitled to.” He characterizes moral rights as “aspirations
117
binding on conscience, [which] impose moral duties on all mankind.”
Alternatively, Holmes argues that the legal or descriptive approach
109

BOBO, supra note 2, at 22.
Franklin, supra note 100.
111
BOBO, supra note 2, at 6.
112
Interfaith Worker Justice, More Info About Wage Theft: Wage Theft FAQ,
WAGETHEFT (2009), http://www.wagetheft.org/moreinfo/moreinfo.html.
113
Id.
114
Interview by Kari Lydersen with Kim Bobo (Jan. 28, 2009),
http://mhpbooks.com/mobylives/?p=3076.
115
HOLMES & SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 16.
116
Id.
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Id. at 17.
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focuses on how legal systems function rather than their justifications.
He asserts that the descriptive approach is less evaluative and “takes no
stand on which human interests are, from a philosophical perspective,
119
the most important and worthy.” In addition, Holmes claims that the
legal rights approach is a pragmatic “inquiry into the kinds of interests
that a particular politically organized society actually protects. Within
[the legal] framework, an interest qualifies as a right when an effective
legal system treats it as such by using collective resources to defend
120
it.” Holmes asserts that under a legal theory, a right only exists when
and if it has budgetary costs, and subsequently, when it is “enforced in
121
functioning and adequately funded courts of law.” Although moral
and legal rights are fundamentally different approaches to defining
rights, some moral and legal theorists believe that an affirmative duty to
122
act accompanies the definition of a right.
A. Moral Rights Theories
There are several different moral definitions of a right, but many
moral philosophers are divided as to “whether, or to what extent rights
123
and duties are logically correlative.” For example, Thomas Donaldson
believes rights “establish minimum levels of morally acceptable
124
behavior.” In an example of his theory, Donaldson states that if an
individual has a right to physical security, then another person must
125
refrain from depriving the individual of that security. He argues that it
would be nice if the second party also treated the individual with
kindness and love, but at a minimum, others in society must respect the
126
rights of individuals. Donaldson also asserts that without a minimal
correlative obligation of respect, a right is weakened and could become

118

Id. at 16.
Id. at 16-17.
120
Id. at 17.
121
HOLMES & SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 19.
122
Compare ALAN R. WHITE, RIGHTS 57-58 (1984), with HOLMES & SUNSTEIN, supra
note 11, at 43-8.
123
Joel Feinberg, Duties, Rights, and Claims, 3 AM. PHIL. Q. 137, 137 (1966); see also
WHITE, supra note 122, at 55.
124
THOMAS DONALDSON, THE ETHICS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 66 (1989).
125
Id. at 66.
126
Id.
119
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obsolete. Conversely, moral theorists Alan White and Joel Feinberg
make duty a larger part of their definitions of rights. White asserts that
many philosophers believe “that one person’s right is correlative with, is
the necessary or sufficient ground of, or is the other side of the same
128
coin as, another person’s duty (or obligation).” Similarly, Feinberg
defines rights as claims, where an individual has a justified entitlement
129
to something from someone, which reflect the assumption of a duty.
Therefore, an ongoing debate exists between moral theorists regarding
130
the extent to which rights and duties are logically correlative.
One result of the debate between rights and duties has been for
some moral theorists to draw a distinction between what are termed
negative and positive rights. Negative rights impose obligations on
131
others to refrain from interfering with the rights of the holder.
Negative rights present a claim by an individual that imposes a negative
duty, often the duty of omission or “for each person a zone of non132
interference from others.” Examples include the “right to privacy, the
right not to be killed, or the right to do what one wants with one’s
133
property, [each] protect[ing] some form of human freedom or liberty.”
On the contrary, positive rights require more than mere omission:
“positive rights impose on us [all] the duty to help sustain the welfare of
134
those who are in need of help.” Positive rights “are rights that provide
something that people need to secure their well being, such as a right to
an education, the right to food, the right to medical care, the right to
housing, . . . the right to a job,” or, relevant to this Article, the right to a
135
minimum wage. Thus, as theorist Henry Shue states, the distinction
between positive and negative rights is “between acting and refraining
136
from acting.” By dividing rights into positive and negative categories,
it may not solve the debate as to what extent rights and duties are
logically correlative, but it does further demonstrate the notion that
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136

Id.
WHITE, supra note 122, at 59-60.
Feinberg, supra note 123, at 137, 142-44.
DONALDSON, supra note 124, at 66.
Velasquez, supra note 9.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
SHUE, supra note 10, at 37.
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where a right does create a duty, “[o]ften [the] duties fall upon more
137
than one class of moral agent.”
However, not all moral theorists believe that rights and duties
138
should be broken into positive and negative categories. Henry Shue
argues against the negative and positive distinction because some rights
do not “fit neatly into their assigned sides of the simplistic
139
positive/negative dichotomy.” In addition, Shue asserts that by
dividing rights into positive and negative categories, there is the
140
tendency to guarantee negative rights first. Shue claims that because
positive rights “are positive and require other people to do more than
negative rights require – perhaps more than people can actually do –
141
negative rights” are essentially easier to guarantee first. Thus, society
will only allocate the remaining resources to guaranteeing positive
142
rights.
Alternatively, Shue argues that the distinction should be based on a
143
hierarchy between basic and non-basic rights. He asserts that basic
rights are defined as “everyone’s minimum reasonable demands upon
the rest of humanity”; they are the rights that are “essential to the
144
enjoyment of all other rights.” Contrarily, Shue asserts that non-basic
145
rights are defined as “intrinsically valuable rights.” Shue argues that
“[i]n practice . . . basic rights need to be established securely before
146
other rights can be secured” and enjoyed. For example, he stresses that
guaranteeing basic rights, such as the right to personal security and
subsistence, “ought to supersede the provision” of a non-basic right like
147
education. Thus, Shue asserts, “if a right is basic, other, non-basic
rights may be sacrificed, if necessary, in order to secure the basic
148
right.” However, “the protection of a basic right may not be sacrificed

137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148

DONALDSON, supra note 124, at 66.
See, e.g., SHUE, supra note 10, at 37.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 19.
SHUE, supra note 10, at 19.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 19.
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in order to secure the enjoyment of a non-basic right” because
149
essentially the sacrifice would be self-defeating. Shue argues that if a
choice needs to be made, enforcing and administering a basic right
150
ought to supersede the enforcement of a non-basic right.
B. Legal Rights Theories
There are variations of legal rights theories, but Stephen Holmes’
definition of rights does not agree with dividing rights into a simplified
151
and orderly scheme of negative and positive rights either. Holmes
admits that simplification can be useful, but he questions “whether the
152
relevant simplification [actually] helps illuminate reality.” Holmes
153
contrarily asserts that all legal rights are positive rights. His notion
develops from the classic legal maxim that “where there is a right, there
154
is a remedy.” Holmes believes that “[i]ndividuals enjoy rights, in a
legal as opposed to a moral sense, only if the wrongs they suffer are
155
fairly and predictably redressed by their government.” In fact, he
asserts that “[n]o right is simply a right to be left alone by public
officials . . . . All rights . . . amount to entitlements defined and
safeguarded by law [and] if rights were merely immunities from public
interference, the highest virtue of government . . . would be paralysis or
156
disability.” Thus, Holmes argues almost every legal right implies a
157
correlative positive duty of enforcement. However, he does note that
rights in American society have both social and budgetary costs, and
158
protection of rights can be limited by the availability of resources.
VI. IS THE WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION’S FAILURE OF DUTY
JUSTIFIABLE?
Whether analyzed from a positive/negative rights dichotomy,

149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158

Id.
SHUE, supra note 10, at 20.
HOLMES & SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 37-39.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 43.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 44.
HOLMES & SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 43-44.
Id. at 21-23.
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Henry Shue’s hierarchical perspective, or Stephen Holmes’ legal rights
theory, the Wage and Hour Division’s failure to fulfill its duty to
prevent wage theft can be defended and even justified. Pursuant to a
positive/negative dichotomy, the right to a federal minimum wage
creates not only a statutory duty of enforcement on the Wage and Hour
Division, but also an affirmative moral duty on all of society to help
sustain the welfare of those who are in need of help. Therefore, the
existence of wage theft is a result of not only the Agency’s failure to
fulfill its statutory duty, but also society’s failure to perform its moral
duty. Under Shue’s hierarchical analysis, the Agency’s failure is
defensible because the right to a minimum wage is a non-basic right,
and the Wage and Hour Division is allocating resources to sustain other
basic human rights such as personal security. Finally, under Holmes’
legal rights theory, the Agency’s failures are arguably justifiable
because it is not equipped with sufficient resources to adequately
enforce the right.
When analyzed pursuant to a positive/negative theory of rights, the
FLSA created a positive right to a federal minimum wage. However, the
statute not only imposed a statutory duty upon the Wage and Hour
Division to investigate, supervise, and enforce the right to a minimum
159
wage, but also a moral duty on all Americans to help improve the
general well-being of workers. This is evidenced in the stated purpose
of the FLSA, which is to prevent “labor conditions detrimental to the
maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health,
efficiency, and general well being of workers [that would] interfere with
160
the orderly and fair marketing of goods in commerce.” Society’s
moral duty is further supported by applying Immanuel Kant’s moral
theory, which is “often used to justify positive” rights, and states that
161
“each of us has a worth or a dignity that must be respected.” Kant
maintained that “humanity must always be treated as an end, not merely
as a means. To treat a person as a mere means is to use a person to
advance one’s own interest. But to treat a person as an end is to respect
162
that person’s dignity.” Therefore, the Wage and Hour Division’s
failure to prevent wage theft is defensible under a positive rights
159
160
161
162

29 U.S.C. § 204(d) (2010).
29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2006).
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analysis because employers are failing to abide by the FLSA and are
abusing the dignities of individuals. Although the Wage and Hour
Division has an affirmative statutory duty to enforce the minimum
wage, society also has a duty to treat workers as an end, not merely a
means to an end. Therefore, the Agency’s failure to fulfill its duty is
defensible, and even justifiable, because society has also failed to fulfill
its correlative moral duty to help enforce the right to a minimum wage.
The Wage and Hour Division’s failure to prevent wage theft can be
justified under Henry Shue’s hierarchical perspective of moral rights as
well. Shue argues that the guarantees of intrinsically valuable rights can
be sacrificed to preserve basic rights, which are the “minimal reasonable
163
demands upon the rest of humanity.” Shue does not argue that basic
rights are uniformly more important than non-basic rights, but rather
asserts that they are given priority when a choice must be made between
164
defending a basic right against a non-basic right. In the case of the
right to a minimum wage, Shue would likely argue that it is a non-basic
right and that the duty of enforcement can be superseded in order to
sustain other basic rights. Shue would likely assert – as he did while
examining the non-basic right to public education –that the enjoyment
of the right to a minimum wage is much “greater and richer – more
distinctively human, perhaps – than merely going through life without
165
ever being assaulted.” However, he would likely argue, based on his
position on public education, that guaranteeing the right to personal
166
security takes priority. Shue would likely defend his position by citing
some of the recent goals of the Department of Labor, which have been
167
to ensure worker safety and create jobs. In addition, Shue would
probably cite that a majority of the 2008 Department of Labor budget is
directed toward programs ensuring worker safety and promoting job

163

SHUE, supra note 10, at 19.
Id. at 19-20.
165
Id. at 20.
166
Cf. id.
167
FY 2008 Budget Overview, supra note 70:
In FY 2008, the Department will spend $803.8 million to make American
workers safer and healthier. The Budget builds on the MINER Act of 2006 and
includes an increase of $16.6 million to retain the 170 coal mine safety and
health enforcement personnel that were added in FY 2006 and 2007.
Id. The budget also proposes approximately $4 billion for training and employment grant
programs to train more workers while reducing overhead and administrative complexity. Id.
164
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168

creation. Therefore, Shue would almost certainly argue that the
intrinsic, non-basic right to a minimum wage is properly being
sacrificed to preserve basic rights such as the right to personal security,
the right to work, and the right to subsistence. Shue would assert that
enjoyment of the right to personal security at work and the right to work
are essential to enjoying the right to a minimum wage. Moreover, he
would likely argue that if more resources were allocated away from
guaranteeing basic rights and instead toward minimum wage
enforcement, it would be self-defeating because a worker would be
169
unable to enjoy a minimum wage if they could not safely work at all.
Thus, by applying Shue’s theory of hierarchical rights, the Agency’s
deficiencies in wage theft enforcement are justifiable because the
overarching Department of Labor is directing its efforts and resources
towards preserving basic rights.
By applying Stephen Holmes’ legal rights theory, one can also
argue that the Wage and Hour Division’s failure to adequately enforce
the federal minimum wage is defensible. Holmes asserts that “[a]ll
170
rights are claims to an affirmative governmental response.” Holmes
also believes that rights are costly, and society must make financial
171
sacrifices in order to acquire or secure them. Therefore, Holmes would
likely find that the Agency’s failure to fulfill its duty of enforcement is
justifiable because it is understaffed and under-resourced. Holmes
would support his conclusion by citing statements made by the
Administrator of the Department of Labor and the Government
Accountability Office, which indicate that the Wage and Hour Division
is struggling to enforce the minimum wage because they are under172
resourced. In addition, Holmes would likely reference that despite the
recent proliferation of wage theft, there have only been marginal
increases in the Wage and Hour Division’s enforcement budget in
173
recent years. Therefore, because Holmes believes that “the quality and
168

Id.
Cf. SHUE, supra note 10, at 19.
170
HOLMES & SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 44.
171
Id. at 21-24.
172
DOL Enforcement Hearing, supra note 52, at 22 (statement of Alexander Passantino,
Acting Adm’r, U.S. Dep’t of Labor Wage and Hour Div.); Id. at 30, 39, 43 (statement of
Greg Kutz, Managing Dir., Gov’t Accountability Office).
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FY 2008 Budget Overview, supra note 70 (stating that the Wage and Hour Division
enforcement budget increased by only $16.7 million dollars from 2007 to 2008.).
169
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extent of rights protection depends on private expenditures, as well as
174
on public outlays,” it is likely that he would conclude that the failures
of the Wage and Hour Division to enforce minimum wage violations are
a product of being financially ill-equipped.
VII. GOING FORWARD; ACTION TO BE TAKEN
Despite the fact that the Agency’s failure to prevent wage theft can
be defended and even justified, wage theft remains a national
175
epidemic and action should be taken to improve minimum wage
enforcement. First, the Wage and Hour Division should publicly
identify perpetrators of wage theft and the widespread effects of such
176
illegal conduct. Not only will publicly identifying criminals serve as a
177
deterrent, but society may be more inclined to fulfill its moral duty to
help improve the general well-being of workers. Second, the Wage and
Hour Division must clearly define which employees are protected by
178
the minimum wage laws. By clarifying and strengthening the
definition of a statutorily-protected employee, the Wage and Hour
Division will spend less time categorizing whether a worker has a valid
claim and more time fulfilling their duty to investigate and enforce
179
wage theft violations. In addition, “[i]t would also level the playing
180
field for law-abiding employers who do right by their workers.” Third,
the Agency must enforce stricter penalties against those convicted of
181
wage theft, especially repeat offenders. Stricter penalties would
include uniformly imposing liquidated damages, interest on the wages
owed, civil penalties, and automatic debarment from government
contracts for all first time offenders. Finally, the government must
infuse the Wage and Hour Division with more funding so that they can
182
hire more investigators and pursue more claims. The funding should
not detract from agencies enforcing other basic rights. However, more
funding generally should allow the Agency to better fulfill its statutory
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182

HOLMES & SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 21.
Grondahl, supra note 7.
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Id.
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duty to enforce the non-basic right to a minimum wage.
If the aforementioned actions are taken, then both society and the
Wage and Hour Division can better fulfill their duty to enforce the
minimum wage and reaffirm the idea that “[w]age and workplace
standards aren’t the dream . . . [t]hey are the bottom-line minimum
184
below which no workplace should fall.” However, if action is not
taken, then the already widespread crisis of wage theft could render the
statutory right to a minimum wage obsolete. For rights have “little value
if those who ostensibly possess [them] lack the resources to make their
185
rights effective.”

183
184
185

Id.
Id. at 68.
HOLMES & SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 20.

